Posts Tagged ‘Deficits’

Ignoring the Hippopotamus next door …

Well, if our own deficit is the Elephant in the Room, what is a nearby E300bn economy heading to bankruptcy?  Will future post-election commentators wonder what on earth the Guardian was doing running so many different columns on bigotgate while the next economic crisis burst upon our shores? (to be fair to the Guardian, they also have live blogging on Greece).

I hope it comes up in tonight’s debate.  Because the Liberal Democrat position on deficit cutting is, macroeconomically, the most sensible.  This letter to the FT today summarises the issues beautifully (from Prof Eatwell):

to what extent will deficit reduction result in the government “chasing its tail” as expenditure cuts result in falling tax revenues as a consequence of lower GDP and employment? Second, what is the true cost of the various measures, ie, the discounted value of the stream of GDP forgone? Third, how does this true cost compare to alternative fiscal strategies (reducing the deficit more slowly or more quickly)?

My spreadsheet attempted to illustrate his first point.  Try chasing some tail by downloading it.

How serious is the Greek situation?  Mohamed El-Erian of PIMCO points out how it threatens the private-sector:

The already material risks of disorderly bank deposit outflows and capital flights are increasing. The bottom line is simple yet consequential: the Greek debt crisis has morphed into something that is potentially more sinister for Europe and the global economy. What started out as a public finance issue is quickly turning into a banking problem too; and, what started out as a Greek issue has become a full-blown crisis for Europe

Is today’s news of a fall in credit demand from businesses and housebuyers signs that Europe is turning down, decisively? It is just a straw in the wind, but if you thought that a second phase of the financial crisis might be triggered by sovereign default hitting into banking balance sheets, would you be borrowing to invest or buy a house?  The Economist’s Ryan Avent is more phegmatic, and seems to rely on “Germans coming to their senses’.  Do you readers think this works?

A Greece restructuring is all but inevitable, but the cost associated with making Greek creditors whole is very small relative to the potential losses associated with continued chaos. … Right now the politics of a bigger German bail-out of southern Europe look deadly, but so did the politics of massive bail-outs of Wall Street financial institutions.

I think he ignores too easily how far we had to go down Crisis Lane to achieve those bailouts.  Making Greek Creditors Whole?  Are you sure?  Moral hazard, justice, anyone?  That would be toxic – not just for Germans.

But the most interesting analyses, for me, comes from Professor Nick Rowe, whose commentary here brings us back to what the Eurozone is really all about – money:

Only the European Central Bank has enough money to fix the Eurozone problem; because it can print it … (BUT) Who has the authority to say that the ECB may risk its seigniorage revenue on buying Greek or other countries’ sovereign junk, when that revenue belongs to all Eurozone governments? Nobody. The Eurozone is not a real country. There is no central fiscal authority behind the ECB. That decision would have to be reached by a political consensus of all Eurozone countries, and I don’t see that happening.

He then describes what may happen in terms that fans of Professor Scott Sumner will recognise – bank insolvency leading to a crisis of escalating money demand:

Eurozone commercial banks hold Eurozone government bonds as assets. With the drop in those bonds’ values, many commercial banks (inside and outside the Eurozone) will become insolvent. There will be (and already are) runs on those banks, as depositors seek to transfer their deposits to safer banks, if any can be found, or withdraw currency, if they can’t.  The first year textbook says this fall in bank deposits will cause a fall in the money supply, and that this fall in the money supply will cause a recession.

But the central bank is prevented, politically, from doing what it needs to: expand the money supply by buying up those government bonds.    His final prediction is intruiging – that sovereign states, having a shortage of Euros, will start printing their own currencies to pay their workers.   New drachma anyone? (Paul Krugman, imagining similar endgames, is now under the table).

How does this play for the UK? Well, our links of contagion are probably less. As Stephanie points out, we are a safe haven compared to Greece.  Check out the What’s In the Vaults Table: it’s French banks who might be in trouble here.  For once, our bankers didn’t get stuck in.  And our economy beats to different rhythms: check out the bullishness about private sector hiring from the CIPD today.

But every party is relying on ‘rebalancing’ – more exports, basically – and how can that happen if Europe is in a panic?  I hope Clegg makes the point powerfully: unlike our Conservative opponents, we don’t believe that cutting back,  in all circumstances and at all times, makes the economy stronger.  And (this is a long-shot) – we need to be more vigorous with the money-medicine if we do teeter into a Double Dip.  Like a wise man once said.

Elementary errors

First, from Johann Hari.  I assume this can’t be from the Tax Justice Network, because they are professionals, and know the difference between a stock and a flow.  Surely.  Johann wrote a wonderful passionate polemic against revolting tax avoiders.  I really enjoyed the piece.   But this bespeaks a lack of understanding of the difference between debt (a stock) and the deficit (a flow):

The invaluable Tax Justice Network has calculated that rich individuals “avoid” £13bn a year and rich corporations £12bn. (Indeed, a third of Britain’s top 700 companies haven’t paid any tax at all.) That’s enough to double the education budget – or to pay off Britain’s entire deficit in seven years without a single dent in public spending.

£25bn is a huge amount of money.   But you don’t ‘pay off’ a deficit.  Both are annual amounts – flows.   The deficit would be reduced by ~1.8% for each year if we got £25bn somehow, but the savings from zero avoidance do not accumulate to the deficit, they accumulate to the debt – the stock.  Which is due to be £1300bn, not £175bn.    Given the moral righteousness on his side, I hope someone from TJN has a quiet word with Johann to make sure that sloppy thinking does not undermine the value of his cause ….  this approving blog is not a good sign, however.   Cutting avoidance would be a good start to the mammoth task ahead.  £25bn every year would be lovely, though if it assumes invariant behaviour from the tax-avoiding oligarchs it is probably unlikely.   But it is a bad idea to go around implying that is all we need to do.   We need to raise taxes and cut spending as well, I’m afraid. Let’s not weaken the will through faulty logic

Next elementary error: Mark Anthony and Caesar as ego-mad rivals?  I’d expect better from the Economist. They should go back and read one of the most gripping scenes in theatrical history (in fact everyone should from time to time).  Anthony was Caesar’s man.  Schumpeter must have been thinking Pompey and Caesar, Pompey and Crassus, Anthony and Octavian, or something else.  How did this get past?  Or am I missing something?

Three graphs, for your edification and amusement

The first two stem from Chris’ excellent recent post about the fiscal deficit.  Not just because it links to me, but for the almost zen-like calm about deficits that it imparts.  You can’t do anything about them with fiscal policy – they just reflect the mirror image of the private sector lending decisions, which are buffeted by far more than governments can control.  From this post then comes the first graph:

In fact, you can see it as well in the US case, from Paul Krugman’s recent post on the Chinese WaterPistol:

where he comments:

The US private sector has gone from being a huge net borrower to being a net lender; meanwhile, government borrowing has surged, but not enough to offset the private plunge. As a nation, our dependence on foreign loans is way down; the surging deficit is, in effect, being domestically financed.

What is the tail, what is the dog? Policy Exchange sometimes imply that a government spending boom is what has is caused our problems.  I have written too much about this to bore you with my responses.   My view is that revenues collapsed; in cash terms, it is unambiguous that this is what separates the l0w-deficit plans from the high-deficit outcomes.  So the collapsing private economy is the dog, and the public deficit the tail.

On the subject of dogs and tails, one of the articles Chris links to makes a funny point about interest rates.   It says:

I don’t just mean that interest rates influence how much we save and invest. They also influence “animal spirits” – low interest rates can engender optimism about the future and hence contribute to investment booms.

I know that Chris knows this, but I’ll make the point anyway, because Scott Sumner taught me to: interest rates reflect supply AND demand for investment funds.   So, of course, a government/central bank can influence the rate by promising to supply funds cheaply for yonks.  Knowing this can cause finance officers everywhere to borrow funds with more confidence, knowing that they are safe from a future liquidity squeeze throwing them out of a job and onto some perp-walk into Congress.

But the level of rates also reflects how much people want to invest.   This demand-side is the bit that worries me, and this last graph is an excellent illustration of the issue.  It shows what people think the inter-bank borrowing rate will be in December 2010 (take the number off 100; a rising graph means falling rates).  The trend is upwards – people think rates are going to stay weak, and they think this because they think the economy will be weak:

You may complain that rates are set by the Bank. This graph is just a reflection of what the market thinks the Bank will do.  But in December 2010, the Bank will be looking forward two years, mashing together expectations of future growth, inflation and so on into one grand view about what it should do with rates.  This graph is a view on a view, all of which amounts to the strength of the economy in the next few years.

So I agree with Chris – obviously – that we need loose money.  But at the end of all this, low rates will be a sign of failure.  Loose money, and persistent indications from the financial markets that they are falling over themselves to get and use some of the stuff, is what we need to see to know that 2011 will be OK.

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